defamation, specifically libel, what three elements must be present to proceed with a lawsuit?

This article presents a general treatment of some defenses that are bachelor to a defendant in an action for amercement based on libel, and to an accused in a criminal activeness for libel. Other jurisdictional and procedural defenses that constitute grounds for a motion to dismiss the civil action or quash the criminal case accept been omitted.¹

1. Parameters. Libel Defined. Equally defined in Art. 353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), "[a] libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or antipathy of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."

Libel is defamation past print, writing, pictures, or signs, every bit distinguished from slander, which is defamation past oral expressions or transitory gestures.² Libel is written or visual defamation; slander is oral or aural defamation.³

Plaintiff or Complainant.

The purported offended party initiating the libel activeness may either be a private person, a juridical person (registered corporation or partnership), a public official or public effigy. The term "public official" broadly covers national or local officials, holding either elective or appointive positions, exercising discretionary powers in the functioning of governmental functions, as distinguished from a "clerk" or "employee" who performs clerical or transmission functions.⁴ In American jurisprudence, non every public employee is a "public official" within the context of libel constabulary.⁵

A "public figure" has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, manner of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate involvement in his doings, affairs and his character, has become a "public personage" or "celebrity."⁶ American authorities generally classify public figures into general-purpose⁷ and limited-purpose⁸ ones.

Accused or Accused. The defendant in the civil or criminal libel activity may exist the writer, author or exhibitor of the defamation; the person who caused the publication or exhibition thereof; the person to whom the alleged defamatory publication is attributed; and the editor, business organization manager or publisher of the paper, mag, or written material where the defamation appears.⁹

two. Absence of an element of libel. Generally, the constitutive elements of libel are: (a) defamatory imputation; (b) malice; (c) publication; and (d) identifiability of the victim.¹⁰ Where ane element is missing, the libel action should exist dismissed.

No defamatory imputation.

Defamatory imputation is the defamatory accusation or charge that the plaintiff alleges is conveyed by the thing published by the defendant concerning the plaintiff. The imputation may take the form of words, symbols, pictures, cartoon or signs. Without a defamatory imputation, there is no libel. For case, the reference in a mag article to a deceased Muslim patriarch as non belonging to a royal house and having once lived with an American family unit, is not defamatory. Titles of royalty are not generally recognized in our national community with republican and egalitarian foundation. Also, it is also not unusual for citizens to live with and share in the civilization or mores of foreigners.^eleven

No actual malice.

Malice indicates the presence of personal ill will or spite, or the intention to injure the reputation of the person defamed.¹² Malice involves an evil intent or motive arising from spite or ill volition; personal hatred or ill will; or culpable recklessness or a willful and wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the person defamed. In a libel case it consists in intentionally publishing, without justifiable cause, whatsoever written or printed matter which is injurious to the character of another. Malice may be defined, insofar as defamation is concerned, as interim in bad faith and with knowledge of falsity of statements.^xiii

The being of malice is implied or presumed by police force from the fact of a defamatory publication (malice in police). The detail intent of the offender to bandage dishonor, discredit or contempt on the person libeled is termed actual malice, or express malice, or malice in fact.¹⁴

However, if the plaintiff or complainant in the libel activity is a public officer or a public figure, the element of "actual malice" has a different connotation.¹⁵

No publication.

Publication refers to the dissemination of the defamatory affair to any person other than the person injuriously afflicted thereby.^sixteen When a public officeholder, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or trunk of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject field thing of the communication, such advice does not amount to publication inside the significant of the constabulary on defamation. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after information technology has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. The reason for such rule is that "a advice of the defamatory thing to the person defamed cannot hurt his reputation though information technology may wound his cocky-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which others concur him."¹⁷

Victim not identified.

The element of identifiability means that the third person who read or learned about the libelous thing must know that it referred to the plaintiff.^xviii In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. Information technology is also not sufficient that the offended political party recognized himself every bit the person attacked or defamed, but it must exist shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication.¹⁹

3. Absence of "actual malice" nether the New York Times test. Defamatory publications against public officials pass through a dissimilar standard of "actual malice." Nether the exam set by the U.S. Supreme Courtroom in the case of New York Times v. Sullivan,²⁰ "actual malice" means the accused made the argument with knowledge that it was faux or with reckless disregard of whether information technology was fake or not. "Reckless disregard of what is false or non" signifies that the defendant entertains serious doubtfulness every bit to the truth of the publication,²¹ or that he possesses a loftier caste of awareness of their probable falsity.²² Actual malice under the New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will.²³

Actual malice is a subjective standard testing the publisher'south adept-faith belief in the truth of his statements.²⁴ The plaintiff must demonstrate that the writer realized that his statement was false,²⁵ in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication, or acted with a high degree of awareness of likely falsity.²⁶

Bodily malice does not incorporate mere suspicions or what a reporter should accept known; it requires that the reporter actually knew that the information on which the article was based was false or the reporter acted with such disregard for the truth equally to rise to the level of recklessness. Bodily malice cannot be imputed but because the information turns out to be simulated. An erroneous interpretation of facts does not meet the standard of actual malice.²⁷

The New York Times standard of "bodily malice" applies as well to libel deportment filed past public figures, including persons who are public figures for all purposes and those who become public figures for a express range of bug.²⁸

The raison d'etre for the New York Times doctrine is that to crave critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on hurting of libel judgments would atomic number 82 to self-censorship, since would-exist critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be truthful, or were in fact truthful, because of doubt whether it could exist proved or because of fear of the expense of having to prove information technology.²⁹ The New York Times ruling has been adopted in our jurisprudence.³⁰

4. Truth of the libelous statement. In libel as a dominion, truth of the defamatory argument is not a defense past itself, as "[e]very defamatory imputation is presumed to exist malicious, even if information technology be true."³¹ Even if the offender is able to evidence the truth of the defamatory statement, he is not relieved from liability. By fashion of exceptions, proof of truth will assist exonerate the author of the defamation in the post-obit:

one. In a criminal prosecution for libel, if the defendant presents, in addition to proof of the truth of the affair charged as libelous, good motives and justifiable ends in publishing the matter, he shall be acquitted.³²

2. When the offended political party is a Government employee, if the defamatory imputation is related to the discharge of his official duties, even if the imputation does not plant a crime, proof of truth is sufficient for acquittal.³³ Nether this exception, it is not required for the defendant or defendant to prove adept motives and justifiable ends in publishing the defamatory affair.

5. Privileged communication. In libel constabulary, the term privileged communication refers to statements which, though having the elements of libel, are nevertheless accorded protection from liability due to considerations or interests that outweigh the need for redress to the private injury sustained by the offended party as a result of the defamatory statements.

The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the complimentary and unfettered administration of justice, though as an incidental event it may in some instances afford an amnesty to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.³⁴

Privileged communication is of 2 kinds: (a) absolute, and (b) conditional or qualified.

Absolutely privileged advice. A communication is admittedly privileged when it is non actionable, even if the author has acted in bad faith. It is a full amnesty granted on the footing of the position or status of the author or speaker.³⁵ This form includes statements made by members of Congress in the belch of their functions as such, official communications made past public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made past the parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, besides equally the answers given by witness in answer to questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or responsive to the questions propounded to said witnesses.³⁶

The privilege is non intended and then much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment and administration of law, equally for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and do their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages.³⁷

The reason for the rule that pleadings in judicial proceedings are considered privileged is not only because said pleadings have become function of public record open up to the public to scrutinize, only likewise to the undeniable fact that said pleadings are presumed to comprise allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature, appropriate to the disposition of problems ventilated before the courts for the proper administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern. Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations essentially true because they can be supported by evidence in good faith, the contents of which would exist under scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein.³⁸

This accented privilege protects but the persons who uttered or wrote the statements in the course of the proceedings. Those who published or caused the publication of such statements may claim the conditional or qualified privilege of a off-white and true study of official proceedings nether the second exception of Fine art. 354, Revised Penal Lawmaking.

Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication.

The privilege consists in the removal of the legal presumption of malice arising from the defamatory imputation contained in the ii types of communication mentioned in Fine art. 354, RPC, which states:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. – Every defamatory imputation is presumed to exist malicious, even if it exist true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making information technology is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A off-white and true study, made in practiced faith, without any comments or remarks, of whatever judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are non of confidential nature, or of whatever argument, report or speech communication delivered in said proceedings, or of any other deed performed past public officers in the exercise of their functions.

The fact that a communication is privileged does non hateful that it is not actionable; the privileged character simply does away with the presumption of malice, which the plaintiff has to prove in such a case.³⁹ The privileged grapheme is lost past proof of bodily malice or malice in fact in making the statement, or by proof of other circumstances that have the effect of taking away the privilege.

A. Private advice. A complaint made in good religion and without malice, fabricated under an honest sense of duty, in regard to the character or acquit of a public official when addressed to an officer or board having some involvement or duty in the matter, is covered by the privilege even if the statements are found to be false, provided that the person has probable cause for belief in the truthfulness of the charge. The duty may pertain to a social or moral duty and the party believes in good faith that he is acting pursuant to such duty.^forty

The requisites of a privileged private communication under the first paragraph of Fine art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code are:

1. The communication is made in adept faith. To be considered privileged, the discipline communication must exist free from any taint of malice.⁴¹ Information technology actualization from the documents presented by the complainant public official from the Public Service Commission, in a proceeding related to the motion filed by the accused to quash the libel case, that the telegram sent by the accused to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications charging that the complainant "enrich herself thru decadent practices [sic]," was not isolated but was linked to the other administrative complaints initiated by the accused confronting the complainant, the libel case should be allowed to proceed and the prosecution given the opportunity to overcome the privileged character of the telegram by proof that the accused was motivated by vengeance or ill-volition in making and sending the telegram.⁴² A private advice, maliciously made by one person to another, although in the operation of a legal, moral or social duty, is not privileged.⁴³

ii. The author has an interest or duty in reference to the subject area. It is the correct and duty of a citizen to make a complaint of any misconduct on the office of public officials, which comes to his find, to those charged with supervision over them.⁴⁴ A party to a civil case sent a letter-complaint addressed to the Supreme Court and coursed through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, charging the presiding estimate hearing his instance with ignorance of the constabulary, gross inexcusable negligence, rendering an unjust decision, and dereliction of duties for delaying the resolution of his move for reconsideration of the conclusion adverse to him. The judge filed a criminal activity for libel against the complainant. Such alphabetic character-complaint is privileged as it falls inside the category of a "communication made in expert faith upon any discipline affair in which the party making the communication has an involvement or concerning which he has a duty," since it was "made to a person having a respective interest or duty, although information technology contains incriminatory or derogatory matter which without the privilege would be libelous and actionable.⁴⁵

3. The recipient of the communication has jurisdiction to enquire into the charges, or the power to redress the grievance, or has some duty to perform or involvement in connectedness therewith.⁴⁶ Simply if a political party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials, such unintentional mistake will not take the case out of the privilege.⁴⁷

iv. The communication is done in private. The privilege is lost if the writer publishes and circulates the communication among the public.⁴⁸ The apportionment of the letter containing defamatory imputations against the mayor, to the municipal courtroom, municipal council, chief of police, removes the letter from the protection of privileged communication.⁴⁹

B. Off-white and true study of official proceedings. The second paragraph of Art. 354, RPC, protects from a libel suit (a) a fair and true written report, (b) made in good faith, (c) without any comments or remarks, (d) of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings, which are not of a confidential nature, or of any argument, written report, or spoken language delivered in said proceedings, or of whatsoever other act performed by public officials in the exercise of their functions.

A fair and truthful report of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated is covered by the privilege.⁵⁰

In i instance, a paper columnist was sued for libel for publishing an article that quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by sure persons charging the brokerage company, particularly its board chairman and controlling stockholder, and its president-general manager, of engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market place. The Supreme Courtroom held that the published commodity was a faithful reproduction of a pleading filed before a quasi-judicial body. "There are no embellishments, wild imputations, distortions or defamatory comments calculated to damage the reputation of the offended parties and expose them to public antipathy. What petitioner has washed was simply to furnish the readers with the data that a complaint has been filed against the brokerage firm. So he proceeded to reproduce that pleading verbatim in his column. Now this is decidedly role and parcel of petitioner'southward job as a columnist whose 'beat' happens to be the stock marketplace. He is obligated to keep the public abreast of the current news in that detail field. On this crucial point, the Court is inclined to resolve all doubts in favor of petitioner and declare that in that location is no libel. It may well be for us to go along in mind that the dominion on privileged communications in defamation cases developed considering 'public policy, the welfare of society and the administration of justice' have demanded protection for public opinion. Therefore, they should not be subjected to microscopic examination to observe grounds of malice and falsehood. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications." ⁵¹

6. Fair comment or opinion. It is a defense to an activity for libel that the words complained of are a fair comment on a matter of public interest. The reason for this is that freedom of speech is not only one of the constitutional rights of a person simply information technology is too absolutely essential to the democratic rules under the aegis of which our libel law was evolved and wherein the people are supposed to sit down in judgment upon all public affairs. Hence, the jealous vigilance with which the costless play of open criticism upon all matters of public interest is safeguarded. The doctrine of fair comment just means that while, generally speaking, every discreditable imputation publicly made is accounted false, considering every homo is presumed innocent until judicially proven, and every faux imputation is presumed malicious, still when the discreditable imputation is directed against an officer in his official chapters, it is not necessarily actionable. In order to exist actionable, the imputation must either exist a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of an stance, based upon proven facts, and then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be erroneous, and so long equally it might be reasonably inferred from the facts. Comments may be fair, although wrong.⁵²

The fair-annotate privilege was established primarily to protect public debate by sheltering communications about matters of public concern.⁵³ Other threads of rationale underlying the protection are: (a) that comment cannot be "false" and therefore cannot be actionable; (b) that annotate will be understood to be simply an individual viewpoint and will therefore tend non to injure reputation; and (c) that, as long as the factual ground for commentary is set forth or readily available, every bit the common law privilege requires, readers may judge for themselves the validity of the stance expressed.⁵⁴

7. Fair criticism. "The plainest principles of natural correct and sound public policy require that the utmost liberty should be accorded every citizen to complain to the supervising, removing and appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public officials with whom he comes into contact." ⁵⁵ The Supreme Court in Vasquez five. Court of Appeals⁵⁶ quoted Justice Brandeis who wrote in Whitney v. California⁵⁷ that "public give-and-take is a political duty" and the "greatest menace to freedom is an inert people."

However, the criticism should be directed at the conduct simply not at the person of the public official.

Men have the right to assault, rightly or wrongly, the policy of a public official with every statement which power can find or ingenuity invent. They may show, by argument good or bad, such policy to exist injurious to the individual and to social club. They may demonstrate, past logic true or false, that it is subversive of human liberty and will result in the overthrow of the nation itself. But the law does not let men falsely to impeach the motives, attack the honesty, blacken the virtue, or injure the reputation of that official. They may destroy, by fair means or foul, the whole cloth of his statesmanship, but the law does not let them to attack the man himself. They may falsely charge that his policies are bad, only they may not falsely allege that he is bad. ten x ten Men may argue, but they may non traduce. Men may differ, simply they may not, for that reason, falsely accuse dishonesty. Men may expect at policies from different points of view and meet them in different lights, but they may non, on that business relationship, falsely charge misdeed, immorality, lack of virtue, bad motives, evil intentions, or corrupt heart or mind. Men may falsely charge that policies are bad, merely they cannot falsely charge that men are bad.⁵⁸

viii. Skilful motives and justifiable ends. As stated in Art. 361, RPC, in every prosecution for libel, the accused shall be acquitted if he is able to prove non only the truth of the matter alleged to exist libelous, but as well that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends.

The beingness of justifiable motive is a question that has to be decided past taking into consideration non just the intention of the author of the publication merely all the other circumstances of each particular case.⁵⁹ Good intentions and justifiable motive constitute a defense insofar as they negative malice.^sixty

In one case, the accused paper editor published an article in which it was alleged that the employees of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry were unjustly exploited, and began with the words: "governmental abuse becomes more scandalous twenty-four hours by day. The most shameless embezzlements are being committed, yet the authors of the law-breaking not simply remain unpunished, but they are sheltered nether the aegis of official patronage." The editor stated in defence force that he published the article in society to ferret out corruption in governmental administration, to throw upon it the searchlight of public opinion, to bring to the attention of the proper regime the unsavory situation of laborers being exploited, and for the printing to defend the rights of weak and ignorant laborers as a affair of borough duty. He was exonerated.⁶¹

9. Freedom of oral communication and of the press. The major purpose of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the printing is to protect the costless discussion of governmental affairs,⁶² equally well as to encourage and nurture uninhibited, robust, and broad-open self-expression, specially in matters of governing importance.⁶³ It rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.⁶⁴

These ramble guarantees are not for the benefit of the printing then much every bit for the do good of all the people,⁶⁵ by giving the citizens unrestricted access to information and views⁶⁶ on all sides of an issue.

Fair criticism by media. The ramble protection extends to criticism of government officials and their deportment. Criticism of those responsible for authorities operations must exist free, lest criticism of government itself exist penalized. There is, start, a strong interest in debate on public issues, and second, a stiff interest in debate near those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those problems. Criticism of government is at the very heart of the constitutionally protected expanse of complimentary word.⁶⁷ The involvement of society and the maintenance of proficient authorities demand a total discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the instance of costless speech. The abrupt incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer nether a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound may be assuaged past the balm of clear conscience. A public official must non exist too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts.⁶⁸ The single purpose of the rule permitting off-white and honest criticism is that it promotes the public adept, enables the people to discern correct from incorrect, encourages merit, and firmly condemns and exposes the charlatan and the cheat, and hence is based upon public policy.⁶⁹ Where the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the involvement in private reputation is overborne by the larger interest, secured past the constitution, in the dissemination of truth.⁷⁰

Error, inaccuracy, and falsity.

Errors or misstatements are inevitable in whatsoever scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with adept religion and reasonable care, the press should non be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the pick of language. There must exist some room for misstatement of fact besides as for misjudgment. Only by giving them leeway can they courageously and effectively function as disquisitional agencies in our democracy.⁷¹ A paper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to written report on events and developments in which the public has a legitimate involvement with the minimum of fear of being hauled to court by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long equally the newspaper respects and keeps with the standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.⁷²

Unprotected utterances and publication.

The protective cloak of the constitutional freedoms of speech and press does not cover the publication and utterance of libels and slanders.⁷³ There is no ramble value in simulated statements of facts; neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society'due south interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open fence on public bug; they belong to that category of utterances which are no essential function of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any do good that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.⁷⁴

Although newspapers are in a privileged class, and press freedom is recognized past all courts, they practice not give any newspaper the legal correct to publish an article concerning a person that is libelous per se.⁷⁵

Jesting in a newspaper may constitute libel. The humorous section of a newspaper might be intended to tickle the fancy, to while away a passing hour with quirk and joke, and to provide amusement for its readers. But the language should non pass from the bounds of playful jest and intensive criticism into the region of scurrilous calumniation and intemperate personalities.⁷⁶

10. Correction or retraction. Prompt correction or retraction may tend to indicate that an erroneous statement was accidental, and it will therefore exist admitted to help plant absence of "actual malice," although it is not conclusive.⁷⁷ A retraction, in guild to operate every bit an constructive check upon the propagation of a defamatory publication, should comprise an access of the incorrectness of the libelous publication and evince a desire to repair the wrong occasioned thereby.⁷⁸ Retraction is non a consummate justification merely a mitigating circumstance, and the virtually that can be said is that the tort was not aggravated.⁷⁹

* Partner, Medialdea Ata Bello Guevarra & Suarez

^{1  Dominion sixteen, Sec. 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Process; Rule 117, Sec. ane, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2  Blackness'south Constabulary Dictionary, 6th Ed., 915, citing Restatement, Second, Torts, Sec. 568. Slander is spoken defamation and differs from libel merely in this respect. fifty Am Jur second Libel and Slander 344
three  Sack and Baron, Libel, Slander and Related Issues, Second Ed., 67. The reasons for the distinction between libel and slander are: (a) a libel is permanent and may circulate through many easily; (b) information technology shows greater malignity on the office of its author than a slander; (c) it is more likely to atomic number 82 to a breach of the peace. Note, What is Libel, 90 SCRA 85 (1979)
4  cf. Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Introductory Provisions, Sec. 2(14)
5  Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 Us 75 (1966): "The 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those amidst the hierarchy of regime employees who have, or appear to the public to take, substantial responsibility for or control over the acquit of government diplomacy. The term applies where a position in government has such credible importance that the public has an independent involvement in the qualifications and performance of the person who performs it, across the general public interest in the qualifications and functioning of all governmental employees. A public official is a person whose position would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person property it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."
6  Ayers Product Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 861 (1988). The Supreme Court adopted the definition of "public effigy" formulated by Professors Prosser and Keeton in their work on Torts, 5th ed., at 859-861 (1984). Included in the "public figure" category "are those who have achieved some caste of reputation by appearing earlier the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball game player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and fifty-fifty ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Great Exalted Ruler of a social club. Information technology includes, in curt, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person."(ibid., at 874-v)
7  A general-purpose public figure is an individual who achieves such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. Gertz 5. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323 (1974). The archetype of the general-purpose public figure is the well-known athlete, entertainer, or politician. Such persons knowingly relinquish their anonymity in return for fame or fortune; it is thus reasonable to attribute a public character to all aspects of their lives. 50 Am Jur 2nd Libel and Slander 387
8  A limited-purpose public figure is an private who voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a item public controversy and thereby becomes a public effigy for a limited range of issues. Such persons presume special prominence in the resolution of public questions. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 7
9  cf. Art. 360, RPC ten  Alonzo v. CA, 241 SCRA 51 (1995); Daez 5. CA, 191 SCRA 61 (1990); People five. Monton, 6 SCRA 801 (1962)
11  Message Publishing Corp. v. Noel, 167 SCRA 255 (1988)
12  U.S. five. Cañete, 38 Phil. 253, 264 (1918); Suarez v. CA, 186 SCRA 339 (1990)
13  Blackness's Constabulary Dictionary, 6th Ed., 957. "Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel." Borjal v. CA, 301 SCRA 1, 28 (1999)
14  Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, third Ed., 571, citing People 5. Peregrino, 65 OG 4834
15  Delight see the next succeeding word on "bodily malice", infra
16  Black'south Constabulary Dictionary, 6th Ed., 1228
17  Ledesma v. CA, 278 SCRA 656 (1997), citing Alonzo v. CA, supra (fn 10)
18  50 Am Jur 2d Libel and Slander 493
19  Borjal v. CA, supra note 13, at 18
20  376 US 254 (1976)
21  St. Amant 5. Thompson, 390 U.S. 731 (1961)
22  Garrison v. Lousiana, 379 U.Southward 74 (1964); Borjal v. CA, supra annotation 13, at 29
23  Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 US 496 (1991)
24  St. Amant 5. Thompson, 390 US 727 (1968)
25  Bose 5. Consumers Union, 466 U.s. 485 (1984)
26  Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, supra note 23
27  fifty Am Jur second Libel and Slander 362
28  Greenbelt Publishing Association, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. half-dozen (1971); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 7
29  Borjal v. CA, supra note 13, at 25-26, citing NAACP 5. Button, 371 United states of america 415 (1963). "The rationale for the New York Times test revolves around the need for free debate on public
30  Lopez v. CA, 34 SCRA 116 (1970); Mercado v. CFI of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93 (1982); Babst v. National Intelligence Board, 132 SCRA 316, 325 (1984); Borjal v. CA, supra note 13, at 29
31  Art. 354, RPC
32  Arts. 354 and 361, RPC
33  Art. 361, RPC
34  Elizalde v. Gutierrez, 76 SCRA 448, 454 (1977); People v. Castelo, 4 SCRA 947, 956 (1962); U.S. 5. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 742 (1918)
35  Sack and Businesswoman, op cit., 411
36  Orfanel v. People, xxx SCRA 819, 823 (1969)
37  Sison v. David, 1 SCRA 60, 71 (1961)
38  Cuenco 5. Cuenco, 70 SCRA 212 (1976)
39  Lu Chu Sing 5. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669 (1946), cited in Suarez v. CA, supra note 12. "A conditional privilege is defined non by the identity of the person speaking, simply past the occasion on which the defamatory statement is made; in some situations an private will not be held liable for fake defamatory statements because the freedom to speak in protection of certain interests is deemed to be more than important than the ability to redress the harm to reputation that such voice communication may cause. But for the speaker to be protected in such situations, the statement must be made in practiced faith, without 'malice' in its common law sense, and the occasion must not be otherwise abused." Sack and Baron, op cit., 411
xl  Mercado five. CFI of Rizal, supra notation 30, citing U.S. v. Bustos, supra note 34, at 743
41  Lacsa five. IAC, 161 SCRA 427 (1988)
42  Mercado 5. CFI of Rizal, supra note 30
43  Imperial five. Ziga, xix SCRA 726 (1967)
44  Daez 5. CA, 191 SCRA 61 (1990
45  Ang 5. Castro, 136 SCRA 453 (1985)
46  U.S. v. Galeza, 31 Phil. 365 (1915)
47  Mercado v. CFI of Rizal, supra note xxx
48  Lacsa v. IAC, 161 SCRA 427 (1988)
49  Daez 5. CA, supra annotation 44
50  Cuenco v. Cuenco, supra note 38, at 234-5, cited in Santos five. CA, 203 SCRA 110, 116 (1991); Manuel v. Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)
51  Santos v. CA, supra note fifty, at 117-8
52  People five. Velasco, CA 40 O.G. 3694; Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. Three, 1988 Ed., 559-560
53  Restatement of Torts, 606(one) (1938); Milkovich 5. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,13 (1990)
54  Sack and Baron, op cit., 234-5
55  People five. Cañete, 38 Phil. 251 (1918)
56  314 SCRA 460, 477 (1999)
57  247 U.Due south. 357 (1927)
58  People five. Contreras, 23 Phil. 513, 516-8 (1912)
59  U.Due south. v. Prautch, 10 Phil. 562, 565 (1908), cited in Daez v. CA, supra annotation 44, at 68
60  Aquino, op cit., 567
61  U.S. v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 225 (1922)
62  Landmark Communications, Inc. five. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)
63  Rosenbloom five. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.Due south. 29 (1971)
64  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 20
65  Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)
66  cf. Firstamerica Development Corp. v. Daytona Beach News-Journal Corp. (Fla) 196 And so second 97, fifteen ALR3d 1238
67  Rosenblatt v. Baer, 385 U.Due south. 75 (1966)
68  U.S v. Bustos, supra note xl
69  Oliver v. La Vanguardia, Inc., 48 Phil. 429, 435 (1925)
seventy  Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.South. 64 (1964). "The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on gratis discussion. As Main Justice Hughes wrote in De Jonge five. Oregon, 299 U.South. 353, 365, it is but through gratis debate and gratis exchange of ideas that authorities remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The correct to speak freely and to promote variety of ideas and programs is therefore one of the master distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. Accordingly, a function of gratis speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed all-time.
71  Borjal 5. CA, supra note 13, at xxx, citing Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 371-ii (1946); Concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge
72  Message Publishing Corp. v. Noel, supra notation 11, at 265
73  Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)
74  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra note 7
75  Phee v. La Vanguardia, 45 Phil. 211 (1923)
76  Aquino, op. cit., 566, citing Oliver v. La Vanguardia, Inc., supra note 69, at 433
77  Sack and Baron, op cit., 304, citing cases
78  Matti 5. Bulletin Publishing Co., 37 Phil. 562, 567 (1918)
79  Oliver v. La Vanguardia, Inc., supra note 69, at 436}

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